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October 25, 2018

Abstract
We develop a dynamic groundwater model that incorporates both groundwater pumping
and investment in deeper wells and apply the model to the arid, alluvial aquifer region of
Northern India that is experiencing rapid depletion. We compute the potential benefits of
regulating groundwater use by comparing the net benefits of groundwater under optimal management to the net benefits under a common pool regime with two different cost structures:
one with flat electricity tariffs, which are widespread in India, and a second with full marginal
cost electricity pricing. Using numerical simulation, we find that the opportunity to invest in
deeper wells significantly exacerbates the common pool problem and suggests the potential for
large benefits (66% of common pool benefits) from optimally managing groundwater use or
new drilling. Flat tariffs exacerbate the problem, but large gains (almost 23%) remain even if
farms are charged the full marginal cost of electricity.
Keywords: groundwater; India; irrigation; common property resource; numerical simulation; dynamic optimization; well capacity
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Introduction

Over the past fifty years, the use of groundwater for irrigation has dramatically increased in developing countries like India and China (Siebert et al., 2010). Increased groundwater irrigation
has enabled higher and more consistent crop yields, which in turn has improved food security
and reduced poverty (Rosegrant and Cline, 2003). However, this increase in groundwater use has
∗
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led to falling water levels and widespread concern about the long-term sustainability of irrigated
agriculture (Hanjra and Qureshi, 2010).
These concerns are especially dire in India, where groundwater use has increased by 500% over
the past fifty years (Garduño and Foster, 2010). The Central Groundwater Board of India estimates
that fifteen percent of the administrative blocks in India extract more water than is replenished
(Central Ground Water Board, 2014) and there is significant concern about rapid depletion (Narula
et al., 2011; Shah, 2012; Mukherji et al., 2013; Fishman et al., 2017). Evidence suggests these
dropping groundwater levels have increased poverty and conflict and decreased agricultural profits
(Sekhri, 2013a, 2014).
On one level, this pattern of falling groundwater levels is not surprising economically, since
groundwater is a common pool resource and is likely to be overused in the absence of mechanisms
to restrict usage. On the other hand, these concerns about overuse are in direct contrast with much
of the groundwater economics literature, which finds that the size of the common pool externality is relatively small in real world scenarios. This result, first identified by Gisser and Sanchez
(1980), suggests that while groundwater levels may be falling faster than optimal, the resulting
welfare losses are negligible. This result has been termed the Gisser-Sanchez effect and has been
found empirically to hold in a diverse array of contexts (Koundouri, 2004; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012;
Lin Lawell, 2016; Sears and Lin Lawell, 2018).
In this paper, we explore this apparent contradiction between the economic theory and the
reality on the ground in India. We construct a Gisser-Sanchez style model that includes three
critical features of the groundwater situation in India: first, that changes in well capacity, rather
than the cost of extraction, are the primary impact of reduced water levels on farmers; second,
that well capacity can be increased through endogenous investment in well deepening and stronger
pumps; and third, that subsidized flat electricity tariffs exacerbate the common pool externality. We
then parameterize our model using numbers that fit the arid alluvial aquifer region of Northwest
India and estimate the size of the externality losses.
Our model differs from the typical groundwater model in that farmers who behave “myopi-
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cally” with respect to the impact of their pumping on future groundwater levels still face a dynamic
investment problem regarding their decisions about well investment. We thus compare an optimal
management regime in which both groundwater pumping and well investment decisions are made
optimally, to an unregulated common pool regime in which individual farmers ignore the impact of
their pumping on future water levels, but make decisions about well investments based on rational
expectations about future groundwater levels.
We find that instituting optimal management increases the present value of the social net benefit
of irrigation by 66%, relative to the common pool situation with flat electricity tariffs. Approximately half this gain could be realized by replacing the flat tariffs with marginal cost pricing of
electricity, but we estimate that optimal management will increase the benefits relative to a common pool regime with real electricity costs by almost 23%, still a sizable gain. We further assess
the impact of several specific parameters on our results and find that differences in the estimated
gains remain non-negligible across a wide variety of parameter values.
Our paper contributes to the literature that investigates the robustness of the Gisser-Sanchez
effect to changes in the model. While much of the work has confirmed the Gisser-Sanchez result,
several notable exceptions identify larger gains to management. These include Brill and Burness
(1994) who incorporate increasing demand, declining well yields, and low social discount rates,
Koundouri and Christou (2006) who consider an aquifer close to depletion without a viable backstop, Tsur and Zemel (1995; 2004) who consider the buffer value of groundwater in the presence
of uncertainty and the possibility of irreversible damage, and Guilfoos et al. (2013) who simulate a
spatially explicit aquifer and find relatively large (27%) gains from management if farmers behave
myopically. Other authors have focused on investments or adaptations farmers may make to reduce
groundwater use. Burness and Brill (2001) consider investment in efficient irrigation technology
and Kim et al. (1989) look at changes in the mix of crops grown over time. Both studies confirm
the Gisser-Sanchez result, finding small inefficiencies under the common pool regime. Instead
of analyzing investments or adaptations that reduce the demand for water, we focus on a lumpy
investment decision that mitigates the impact of falling water levels on farmers.
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We also contribute to a growing literature on the importance of well capacity for understanding
the implications of groundwater depletion. Brill and Burness (1994) provide early evidence that
declines in well yield as water levels fall can lead to large gains from management. More recently,
Foster et. al (2014; 2015a; 2015b) emphasize the importance of well capacity for intra-annual
decisions about crop choices. Manning and Suter (2016) include the effect of neighbors on well
capacity in a spatially explicit three cell aquifer for a basin in Colorado and find small gains from
management (2%) when farmers behave optimally.1 We extend this work by applying the ideas in
a developing country context and incorporating the option to overcome reductions in well capacity
through investment in deeper wells and stronger pumps.2
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the groundwater situation in India. Msangi and
Cline (2016) analyze groundwater policy options and estimate small percentage gains from groundwater management in the hard-rock aquifer region of southern India. Previous work has analyzed
how subsidized, flat electricity tariffs increase groundwater extraction beyond the socially optimal
level (Badiani et al., 2012; Fishman et al., 2016; Badiani and Jessoe, 2017).3 Smith et al. (2015)
embed these tariffs in a macroeconomic model and show that these subsidies cause spillover losses
in the manufacturing sector. Separate work has analyzed the external social costs of repeated well
deepening by farmers in response to falling groundwater levels (Shah, 2012; Fishman et al., 2017).
We add to this literature by analyzing these two features simultaneously in a dynamic framework. Critically, we find that these market failures compound each other: electricity subsidies
substantially exacerbate the common pool externality by increasing (socially wasteful) investment
in deeper wells and stronger pumps. This result is in contrast to earlier work that has found relatively small deadweight losses from the electricity subsidies in a static framework (Badiani and
Jessoe, 2017).
1 Recent

work by Merrill and Guilfoos (2018) also addresses this question.
their application is to fisheries rather than groundwater, Squires and Vestergaard (2018) consider the impact of investment and knowledge spillovers in a dynamic common pool resource setting and find that the commons
problem is more severe than without these features.
3 These papers that analyze the impact of flat electricity tariffs on groundwater are part of a larger literature that
explores the impact of energy prices on water usage and groundwater extraction (Zhu et al., 2007; Zilberman et al.,
2008; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014b).
2 While

4

Authors' Accepted Manuscript
Forthcoming at the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide additional background
on the groundwater situation in India. In Section 3, we construct a stylized model of groundwater
use and investment. In Section 4, we describe the specific functional forms and parameters used in
our numerical simulations. In Section 5, we present the results of our numerical simulations for our
baseline parameters and several sets of comparative statics. We also discuss the robustness of our
results to certain changes in the structure of our model. In Section 6, we discuss the implications
of our results as they relate to groundwater policies. In Section 7, we conclude and discuss the
broader applicability of our simulation results.

2

Background

The over-exploitation of groundwater in India has been especially problematic in the arid alluvial
aquifer regions of Northern India, including the states of Punjab, Haryana, parts of Rajasthan and
northern Gujarat (Shah, 2012). While the existing groundwater literature captures many important
features of the groundwater problem, it does not adequately describe the situation in this region.
In Gisser and Sanchez’s work, the groundwater externality exists because pumping by individual
farmers lowers the water levels and thus increases the extraction costs for their neighbors. At
the same time, these falling water levels provide feedback that limits the size of the externality:
as costs increase, farmers reduce their pumping, slowing the decline. This continues until the
aquifer reaches a steady state where consumptive water extractions equal the natural inflow rate.
In the optimal management regime, steady-state extraction is the same (the natural inflow rate),
but pumping will slow faster so that the steady-state water level is higher and extraction costs
are reduced. The size of the common pool externality is largely a function of how different the
steady-state extraction costs are. Notably, since access to groundwater is limited to farmers with
land overlying the aquifer, a degree of exclusivity exists. Instead of an open-access resource, for
which we would expect all benefits to be competed away, groundwater resembles a common pool
resource that will be overused, but will still yield positive net benefits in the steady-state.
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In our study region, the relationship between water levels and farm profits is different. In this
region, as in much of India, the government provides generous electricity subsidies, amounting
to roughly 85% of the actual cost of electricity. Furthermore, farmers are charged a flat monthly
tariff for electricity rather than a per unit charge (Badiani et al., 2012; Badiani and Jessoe, 2017).4
As water levels fall, farmers face no change in the direct cost of extracting water. Instead, the
drop affects farmers by reducing the volume of water they can pump from their well in a given
amount of time. Recent work has emphasized the importance of this well capacity effect in other
regions (Foster et al., 2014, 2015a,b; Manning and Suter, 2016; Hrozencik et al., 2016; Merrill and
Guilfoos, 2018).
In response to this declining yield, farmers can reduce the acreage they irrigate or deepen their
well and purchase a more powerful pump. As they invest, farmers incur a large capital cost. Moreover, the deeper wells and larger pumps have higher maintenance costs and increase the flat electricity tariff farms face. The annualized costs of this repeated investment in deepening wells have
been estimated to be as high as 25% of the average annual net income from crops (Narula et al.,
2011). These investments allow the farmers to maintain their previous extraction levels, circumventing the self-limiting feedback effect, at least as long as the well deepening investments remain
profitable. At some point, farmers may have to migrate or exit agriculture. Fishman et al. (2017)
demonstrate heterogeneity in this response, with rich farmers from socially advantaged castes being more likely to invest in deeper wells, while poorer farmers from socially disadvantaged castes
are more likely to fall back on rainfed agriculture.
Although the importance of well capacity is receiving increased attention in the groundwater
economics literature, the linkage between depths and investment has not been explored in detail.
These repeated investments function like a form of entry. As water levels fall, farmers must continually “re-enter” the irrigation industry by upgrading their technology in the form of deeper wells
with stronger pumps. We should expect this entry to continue as long as the net benefit of entry is
positive. But each decision to “re-enter” lowers the profits of all neighbors because it reduces the
4 This

monthly tariff is based on the capacity of the pump.
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length of time before another round of investment will be required.5 The net benefit of irrigation to
individual farms, inclusive of the investment costs, will eventually be driven close to zero. Moreover, these investments serve only to maintain a prior status quo and can only temporarily address
the fundamental challenge in the region: that the available water is not sufficient to irrigate all the
land farmers wish to cultivate.
Based on these observations, we incorporate limits on well capacity, endogenous investment,
and flat electricity tariffs into a groundwater use model described in the next section.

3

Model

Following the approach of the Gisser and Sanchez literature, our analysis compares the net benefits
of two alternate regimes. We simulate the path of groundwater levels, extractions, and investment
over time in a common pool regime. We then compare those levels—and the resulting net benefit
from the aquifer—to those obtained if a benevolent dictator selected extraction and investment
levels for each farmer in every period. This gives an upper bound on the potential gains from
regulation. In this section, we present an analytical model describing extractions and investments
under the two regimes. In Section 4, we specify functional forms and parameterize the model.

3.1

Model set up

We consider a groundwater aquifer with individual farmers, indexed n = 1, ..., N. We simplify the
investment decision by granting farmers access to a series i = 1, ..., I of technologies for extracting
water. Each technology is comprised of a well of a particular depth and a corresponding pump,
ordered by increasing maximum depth, and therefore also by increasing cost. We model well deepening as a discrete choice to emphasize the fixed investment costs associated with any deepening.
We abstract away from the decision of how deep to drill at a given point in time by considering a
5 Liu

et al. (2014) incorporate an entry decision into a spatially explicit laboratory experiment groundwater exploitation game and observe inefficiently high entry levels.
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series of fixed feasible depths.6 At time t, the current technology state on farm n is snt . The current
pumping depth in the aquifer is given by dt . The maximum amount of water a farm can extract
each year depends on both the current pumping lift and the current technology state and is given
by W (dt , snt ), where snt > sent implies W (dt , snt ) ≥ W (d, sent ) .
The instantaneous net benefit of water use as B (wnt , dt , snt ), where wnt is the amount of groundwater used. We assume that the gross benefits of water use are constant across technologies and
depths, but that dt and snt affect the annual net benefit by altering the energy needs and electricity charge farms face.7 This function reflects the highest instantaneous net benefit a farmer can
achieve from using wnt in a given period and subsumes choices about how much to irrigate and
what crop to plant. Moreover, we abstract away from farm level variation in the benefits and costs
of water use and assume that all farms with the same technology have the benefit function.
In each period, farmers choose their next-period technology, ant . Evidence from Fishman et al.
(2017) indicates significant farm-level variation in the investment decision. Investment cost varies
across farms for a number of reasons including factors like wealth and caste that can influence access to credit and physical characteristics like overall farm size and degree of parcel fragmentation
that can influence the effective per hectare cost of investment (Sekhri, 2011). To capture this variation, we include a farmer-specific investment cost parameter ωn . The cost for farmer n of choice
ant given current technology snt is C (ant , snt , ωn ), with C (·) non-decreasing in ω for all a and s. If
a farmer elects to not change technology, then ant = snt and the cost represents the annual maintenance cost. If a farmer chooses to change technologies, then ant 6= snt and the cost is the switching
cost. The technologies are ordered in terms of both increasing limits and increasing investment
cost and this ordering is constant for all farms. Thus i > j implies that C (i, k, ωn ) ≥ C ( j, k, ωn )
for all k 6= i, j and all ωn and W (d, i) > W (d, j) for all d. Finally, maintenance costs are similarly
ordered so that i > j implies that C (i, i, ωn ) ≥ C ( j, j, ωn ) for all ωn .
We track N individual state variables (current well technology on each farm) and one aggregate
6 See

Section 5.3.1 for a discussion of how changes in the fixed depths considered influence our results.
some of our simulations, we also allow farmers to consider a different net benefit function than the social
planner to capture the real world existence of flat, subsidized electricity tariffs.
7 In
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state variable (pumping lift in the aquifer). Next period’s technology on farm n is determined by
this period’s choice, so snt+1 = ant . Since we focus on the broad relationships between the pumping
cost externality, well capacity and investment, we follow much of the Gisser-Sanchez literature and
use a simplified hydrological model. Specifically, we assume that pumping depths instantly equate
throughout the aquifer according to the equation

(1 − α) ∑N
n=1 wnt − ρ
dt+1 = dt +
φ

(1)

where ρ is the natural rate of inflow into the aquifer (assumed constant over time), α is the percentage of water applied to crops that percolates back to the aquifer, and φ is the volume of net
water extraction that results in a one meter increase in pumping depths.8

3.2

Common pool regime

In a common pool regime, individual users are small relative to the aquifer and ignore their own
impact on the future level of the aquifer. Unlike the typical groundwater problem with a bathtub
aquifer, the individual farmer’s problem is dynamic because the farmer must decide when to switch
technologies. In each period, individual farmers take the path of the future pumping depths (d) as
given and choose how much to pump this period (wnt ) and what technology to use next period
(ant ).
3.2.1

Annual water use under a common pool regime

Since farmers take the path of depths as given, water use decisions are made on a year by year basis
and depend only on the farm’s current technology and the current pumping depth. The Lagrangian
8 Like much of the groundwater literature, this model simplifies the true hydrology.

Papers exploring the importance
of spatially explicit models include Saak and Peterson (2007); Brozović et al. (2010); Guilfoos et al. (2013); Hrozencik
et al. (2016); Liu et al. (2014); Manning and Suter (2016); Merrill and Guilfoos (2018). Spatially explicit models are
difficult to solve even when considering only groundwater depth and usage due to the large increase in the number
of required state variables. A spatially explicit model incorporating investment would require twice as many state
variables as one incorporating only groundwater depth and usage and would be numerically intractable.
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for farmer n’s common pool water use problem is


L wnt , λntCP ; dt , snt = B (wnt , dt , snt ) + λntCP (W (dt , snt ) − wnt )

(2)

where λntCP is the Lagrange multiplier for the limit on water use on farm n at time t. The first-order
conditions are
∂B
(wnt , dt , snt ) − λntCP = 0
∂ wnt

(3)

λntCP (W (dt , snt ) − wnt ) = 0

(4)

with λntCP ≥ 0 for all n and t. Let w∗CP (dt , snt ) be the solution to this system of equations and let
B∗CP
nt (dt , snt ) = B



∗CP
wnt (dt , snt ) , dt , snt

(5)

be the optimized value.
3.2.2

Investment under a common pool regime

Farmer n’s investment problem is to solve
∞



∗CP
max ∑ δ Bnt (dt , snt ) −C (ant , snt , ωn ) subject to snt+1 = ant

an1, ...,an∞

t

(6)

t=0

taking d as given. We reformulate this problem as a discrete time, discrete choice decision problem
using dynamic programming. This yields the dynamic programming equation

V

CP

(sn , n,t; d) = B∗CP
nt (dt , snt ) +

n
o
CP
max
δV (ant , n,t + 1; d) −C (ant , snt , ωn )

an ∈{1,..,I}

(7)

where V CP (s, n,t; d) is the (unknown) continuation value in the common pool regime to farmer
n of technology state s at time t, given that pumping depths are expected to follow the path d.
Farmer n currently using technology i will maintain that technology as long as the investment cost
10
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is greater than or equal to the discounted difference in continuation value, or as long as


C ( j, i, ωn ) −C (i, i, ωn ) ≥ δ V CP ( j, n,t + 1; d) −V CP (i, n,t + 1; d)

(8)

for all j 6= i. As this inequality indicates, farmers consider the effect of their investment choices
on their ability to extract water in the future and the impact that will have on their future profits.
However, since they take the depth trajectory as given, they do not consider the impact their increased pumping will have on future water levels. Yet over time, the combined impact of water use
and technology choice collectively determine the path of pumping depths. We assume that farmers
rationally predict the impact of all farmers’ decisions on future depths and thus require that


∗CP d , s∗CP (d) − ρ
(1 − α) ∑N
t nt
n=1 wnt
dt+1 = dt +
φ

(9)

where s∗CP
nt (d) is the optimized technology choice for farm n at time t for the problem described
in Eq. (7). The full solution to the common pool problem is thus the joint solution to the system
defined by Eqs. (3), (4), (7), and (9).9

3.3

Optimal management regime

Under optimal management, the social planner’s decisions about both pumping and investment
take into account the impact these decisions have on future groundwater levels and investment on
other farms. The social planner selects trajectories of investment choices {a1 , a2 , . . .} and water
use vectors {w1 , w2 , . . .} where at is an N × 1 vector of technology choices with ant ∈ {1, . . . , I}
and wt is an N × 1 vector of water use amounts. Let g (w, d) = d +

(1−α) ∑N
n=1 wn −ρ
φ

be the next

period depth as a function of current period water use. The social planner has both discrete and
9 See

Section 5.3.2 for a discussion of the common pool outcome when farmers naively expect water levels to
remain constant at their currently level and update their expectations annually.
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continuous choices, giving the nested optimization problem:
(

"

N

V (d, s) = max − ∑ C (an , sn , ωn ) + max
a

n=1

w

#)

N

∑ (B (wn, d, sn)) + δV (g (w, d) , a)

(10)

n=1

subject to
0 ≤ wn ≤ W (d, sn )

(11)

for all n.
The first order conditions for annual water use and investment choices under optimal management are derived in the following section and compared to those from the common pool regime.

3.4

Comparison of the common pool and optimal management regimes

The differences between the optimal management and common pool scenarios are described in the
following four propositions.
Proposition 1. Farms will pump more water in the common pool scenario than is optimal.
Contingent on a vector of technology choices, the social planner will set water use on individual
farms to solve the inner maximization problem, whose first-order conditions are

wn




∂V
1−α
∂B
OPT
= 0
(wn , d, sn ) + δ
(g (w, d) , a)
− λn
∂w
∂d
φ

(12)

λnOPT (W (d, sn ) − wn ) = 0


∂B
∂V
1−α
(wn , d, sn ) + δ
(g (w, d) , a)
− λnOPT ≤ 0
∂w
∂d
φ

(13)

W (d, sn ) − wn ≥ 0

(15)

(14)

As in most groundwater models, the condition for determining water use wn under optimal
management given in Eq. (12) differs from the common pool condition given in Eq. (3) through
the inclusion of the

∂V
∂d

(·) term that captures the negative effect of today’s pumping on water

levels. Thus, a farm with a given technology at a given depth will use more water in a common
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pool scenario than under optimal management.
In much of the groundwater literature, the impact of this overpumping is small. In our setting,
the impact is larger because overpumping is exacerbated in two distinct ways. First, in our simulations that reflect the on the ground reality in India, the cost of pumping that farmers consider in
decision making is not the full social cost of pumping due to subsidized flat electricity tariffs. In
this case,

∂B
∂ w (wn , d, sn ),

which represents the instantaneous marginal net benefit of a given amount

of water pumped from a given depth, is higher for the farmer than the manager, exacerbating the
farmer’s tendency to overpump. Second, as we demonstrate below, overpumping will be exacerbated by overinvestment.
Proposition 2. Farmers will more invest in the common pool scenario than is optimal.
As in the common pool scenario, we characterize investment through an inequality. Let ãt and
ât be two investment vectors that differ only in investment on farm n and are optimized for all
other farms and let w̃t and ŵt be the associated vectors of optimal water use. Formally, let ãnt = i,
ânt = j, and ãmt = âmt for all m 6= n. The social planner will view ãt as optimal and maintain
technology i on farm n if

C ( j, i, ωn ) −C (i, i, ωn ) ≥δ [V (g (ŵt , dt ) , ât ) −V (g (ŵt , dt ) , ãt )]
N

+ ∑ B (ŵnt , dt , snt ) + δV (g (ŵt , dt ) , ãt )
n=1
"

#

N

−

∑ B (w̃nt , dt , snt ) + δV (g (w̃t , dt ) , ãt )

(16)

n=1

for all j 6= i. The left hand side of this equation is the same as the left-hand side of the common
property condition (Eq. (8)) and represents the investment cost associated with adopting technology j on farm n. The right-hand side of Eq. (16) captures the impact of two differences between
the two investment regimes. The first line gives the discounted continuation value of having better
technology next period and is analogous to the right hand side of Eq. (8). The second two lines
represent the impact of changes in water use in response to the investment. If the social plan13
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ner elects to invest, the vector of water use this period will change as well. Since w̃t maximizes
∑N
n=1 (B (wn , d, sn )) + δV (g (w, d) , ã), we know that the magnitude of the last line is greater than
the magnitude of the second line, implying that the benefit of investment will be lower under optimal management than under common pool. The social planner will be more likely to maintain
the current technology. Intuitively, investment implies more pumping today, which lowers future
water levels and lowers the continuation value.
Proposition 3. Overinvestment in well capacity will exacerbate common pool overpumping.
The water use conditions (Eqs. 3 and 12) both contain a Lagrange multiplier for the well
capacity constraint. Since farmers are more likely to invest in deeper wells under the common
pool scenario, this constraint is less likely to bind at a given depth. As a result, overpumping in the
common pool scenario will increase further.
Proposition 4. Overpumping will exacerbate common pool overinvestment, due to rational expectations.
Similarly, the investment conditions (Eqs. 8 and 16) both contain a term that measures the
increase in continuation value attributable to better technology. Because pumping is higher in
the common pool scenario, the rationally expected depth trajectory will include lower depths. This
increases the value of the better technology and makes farmers more likely to invest in the common
pool regime than under optimal management.
Neither of our problems have closed-form solutions, so we turn to numerical simulation. Given
the high dimensionality of the optimal management problem, we first modify the problem to focus on the share of farms using each technology. This modification is described in the Online
Appendix. In the next section, we provide specific functional forms for each of the elements of
our model and select parameters for the equations that are reflective of the situation in our study
region.
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4

Numerical simulations

Rather than simulating a specific aquifer, we conduct numerical simulations using parameters that
are broadly appropriate for western and north-western India, an area that has experienced dramatic
groundwater declines (Shah, 2012). We first provide additional structure to the general functions
described in our prior model section and then describe how we parameterized these functions.

4.1

Functional forms

We use a linear marginal benefit of water curve until the amount of water needed to fully irrigate a
farmer’s plot (w̄) is reached. Beyond this point, the marginal benefit of water is zero. The true cost
of pumping water is linear in depth to groundwater, but in some of our simulations farmers pay
only a flat tariff for electricity. Both the marginal benefits and true pumping costs are independent
of the well technology, but the flat tariffs vary across technologies. The net benefit function for
water is given by
B (w, d, s) =




β w − 1 γw2 − wεd − τ (s) if w < w̄
2


β w̄ − 1 γ w̄2 − wεd − τ (s) if w ≥ w̄
2

where τ (s) is the technology specific electricity tariff. Under optimal management and a counterfactual common pool simulation, we set ε equal to the estimated true cost of the electricity needed
to lift one cubic meter of water one meter and set τ to zero. In the common pool simulations that
reflect the flat tariffs in our study region, we set ε = 0 and have non-zero values of τ.
Investment in this region primarily comes in the form of deepening existing wells and purchasing new and more powerful pumps. We adopt a simple formula for the extraction capacity given
a farmer’s current technology and the water depth. Each technology has a maximum depth (d¯i ) at
which it can extract any water and a maximum depth (d˜i ) at which it can deliver enough water to
fully irrigate a farmer’s land. Between these two points, water limits fall linearly giving a water
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limit function of

W (d, i) =





0




w̄






w̄

if d ≥ d¯i


d¯i −d
d¯i −d˜i



if d˜i < d < d¯i
if d ≤ d˜i .

Our investment cost has two components. First, we identify a baseline level of maintenance expenditures for each technology (denoted by χii ) and a baseline cost of moving from technology i to
technology j (denoted by χi j ). We assume that farmer heterogeneity scales these costs uniformly,
yielding an investment cost function of the form

C ( j, i, ω) = χi j ω.

The distribution of ω values in the population has probability density function f (ω) and cumulative distribution function F (ω). In our simulations, we assume a uniform distribution between 1
and an upper bound Ω.

4.2

Parameterization

We now describe how we selected our parameter values. Table I presents the parameter values;
additional details about their derivation are given in the Online Appendix.

4.2.1

Water benefit parameters

We assume the average farmer has four hectares of land that they plant for three cropping seasons:
one rainy season and two dry seasons.10 The primary crops are rice, pulses and oilseeds. Rice is
water-intensive and must be irrigated but can be cultivated in all three seasons. Pulses and oilseeds
do not require irrigation but are only grown during the rainy season. We construct a water benefit
function reflecting farmers’ options about which of these crops to grow: specifically what acreage
10 The rainy season is kharif (June–September) and the dry seasons are rabi (November–February) and the summer
season (March–May).
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of rice to grow (and irrigate) each season.11 We use the rice irrigation requirements from Fishman
et al. (2015) and net revenue estimates from ICRISAT (2015) to calculate the maximum value of
water potentially used and the marginal benefit of water.12 We find a farm may use up to 40,000 m3
of water per hectare (ha) of land. We estimate that the marginal benefit of water ranges from 1.3
Rs./m3 of water during the rainy seasons to 1.13 Rs./m3 during the dry seasons, suggesting a very
flat marginal benefit of water curve (see the Online Appendix for more details). These numbers
likely understate the importance of at least a minimal amount of irrigation to small subsistence
farmers. In our baseline simulations, we varied the marginal benefit of water from 2 Rs./m3 for
the first unit of irrigation water to 1.13 Rs./m3 at the maximal level of extraction (40,000 m3 /ha).
Beyond this level, we set the marginal benefit of water to zero. We discount benefits and costs at
10% per year.

4.2.2

Well technology and cost parameters

Each well technology choice includes the depth of the well and the horsepower of the associated
pump. Groundwater pumps must provide appropriate power for the depth of the well.13 For
tractability, we selected three well types, with maximum depths of extraction that are representative
of tubewells in our region —25, 50, and 75 meters—each matched with an appropriately sized
pump (Ministry of Water Resources, 2007).14 We assume that each technology can extract enough
water to fully irrigate a farmer’s land during all three seasons up to a depth of 10, 30 and 60 meters
and couple the wells with pumps whose capacity is sufficient to deliver this much water at these
depths. Between the upper and lower bound, well capacity declines linearly.
To estimate the cost of moving between our three well technologies, we use cost estimates for
tubewells and electric pumps from Ministry of Water Resources (2007) and Sekhri (2011). We
11 We

model the problem this way because evidence suggests that farmers adjust their water usage by reducing
acreage planted in rice rather than the reducing the amount of water used per hectare (Fishman et al., 2017).
12 ICRISAT (2015) gives net revenue numbers which we convert to net income by that assuming net income (exclusive of groundwater costs) is equal to 50% of the net revenue.
13 A pump that is too powerful will waste electricity and draw sediment and debris into the pump, impairing function,
while a pump that is too weak will be unable to deliver water to the surface (Kumar Maitra, 2011).
14 In Section 5.3.1, we test the robustness of our results considering simulations with different well technology
choices.
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include cross-farmer variation in investment costs to capture variation in characteristics such as
wealth, caste, information, credit, and land characteristics. Parameter values are listed in Table I
and the Online Appendix provides additional details on their construction. We use data on annual
maintenance costs from Ministry of Water Resources (2007) to set the annual annual maintenance
costs of each technology. Since investment costs are important in our model, we conduct several comparative static simulations varying different elements of the cost function, to address the
difficulty of precisely estimating these cost parameters.
We use estimates of pump-specific flat rate electricity tariffs from Badiani and Jessoe (2017)
to estimate the cost of electricity and our electricity tariff parameters for each well type.

4.2.3

Aquifer parameters

The state equation for the evolution of groundwater levels requires three parameters: the return
flow coefficient, the annual inflow of water, and the aquifer storativity. The return flow coefficient
measures the share of extracted groundwater that returns to the aquifer and we use a value of 25%
for this parameter, based on data from Ministry of Water Resources (2009). The annual inflow (or
recharge) is the amount of water, exclusive of return flow, that flows into the aquifer each year.
We set this number relative to the maximum consumptive use in the region. Specifically, we set
it equal to one-third of maximum consumptive use, based on groundwater usage estimates from
(Suhag, 2016) and sown area estimates from Fishman et al. (2016) (see the Online Appendix for
more details). To parameterize aquifer storativity, we use an inductive approach. Groundwater
levels have been dropping as much as 3 m per year with current extraction (Fishman et al., 2017).
We infer a storativity value by assuming that if all farmers in the region fully irrigated their land
every year, water levels would drop 3 m each year.
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5

Results

5.1

Baseline simulations

The water level and associated pumping cost in each of our three scenarios with our baseline
parameters are illustrated in Figure 1, while Figure 2 illustrates water use in the region over time.
Given the parameters described in the previous section, the sustainable steady-state level of water
use in all three scenarios is 13,333 m3 /ha m3 /ha (of which 10,000 m3 /ha is consumptive). The
height of the top line in each panel of Figure 2 illustrates the weighted average water extraction per
ha with the colors indicating how much water was extracted by each technology. Since we set the
marginal benefit of water to zero beyond 40,000 m3 /ha, water use never exceeds this level. Finally,
Figure 3 presents the cumulative present value of costs and net benefits for the first 50 years in
each case.
Result 1. Optimal management increases net social benefit by 66% relative to a common pool
regime with flat tariffs.
Under the flat tariffs that generally prevail in the region, we see repeated waves of investment
in technologies that allow farmers to extract water from farther below surface. The water level
drops rapidly until the volume of water that can be pumped from type 1 wells begins to decline.
Farms then rapidly invest in deeper wells to restore their ability to fully irrigate their land. The
decline resumes and the same pattern repeats when type 2 wells begin to fail.15 Since our model
includes only three technologies, as technology 3 begins to fail, farmers’ ability to extract water
falls. We eventually reach a steady state when the reduced extraction capacity of wells limits
overall consumptive extraction to the annual recharge level. As we demonstrate in Section 5.3.1,
when we include the option to investment in another technology, we see continued investment.
With flat tariffs, water levels stabilize at 70m below the surface. At this level, the actual cost
of pumping water to the surface exceeds the marginal benefit of water. This is consistent with
15 Note

that although farmers in our model have the option to invest in type 3 wells immediately, saving roughly 4%
of the total investment cost by making a single transition. Given the discount rate, farms save more by delaying the
second investment.
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studies suggesting that if farmers were paying the full cost of their electricity use, profits would
be negative (Narula et al., 2011). Irrigation imposes a social cost of almost 15,000 Rs./ha each
year. However, under flat tariffs, farmers with type 3 wells pay a low tariff and earn profits in the
steady-state.
The optimal management scenario is starkly different. Since water extractions in the steadystate are limited to 13,333 m3 /ha, the benevolent dictator seeks to keep the cost of extracting
that water low. Consistent with the descriptions of the region, investment in new technologies is
inherently wasteful from a social perspective. The new wells do not increase the sustainable water
extraction capacity; they merely enable farms to extract the same water from deeper depths. The
investment increases the cost of farming twice: water costs more to extract, and the investment
cost itself is wasteful. Optimal management sharply curtails pumping on individual farms. Water
levels are allowed to drop to 20m since type 1 wells can extract the sustainable level from this
depth. Farms have the same marginal value of water as they do in the flat tariff case, but extraction
costs are much lower. Instead of losing roughly 15,000 Rs./ha each year in the steady-state, society
gains approximately 15,000 Rs./ha annually.
Given this stark contrast, optimal management would increase the net social benefit of irrigation
in the region by 66%. The common pool scenario with flat tariffs yields higher profits in the early
years, but this advantage is quickly reversed. Still, since they are only paying a small portion of
their energy costs, farmers themselves are roughly 10% worse off under the optimal management
scenario than they are in the common pool scenario with flat tariffs.16
Result 2. Marginal cost electricity pricing reduces but does not eliminate the gain from optimal
management.
Farmers in our second set of baseline simulations face the actual marginal cost of electricity
but no regulatory limitations on water usage. As under flat tariffs, water levels drop rapidly and,
16 Note

that this does not suggest that the common pool outcome maximizes the benefits to farmers under flat tariffs.
Finding the optimal outcome from the farmers’ perspective, taking the flat tariffs as given, would require solving a
different dynamic optimization problem. It would, however, be cheaper for the government to implement the optimal
management solution we identify and to compensate farmers for their loss than it would be to impose this “pseudooptimal” solution.
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as type 1 wells fail, farmers transition to type 2. When type 2 wells begin to fail at around 30m of
depth, farmers now face considerably higher pumping costs. While the marginal benefit of water
exceeds the marginal cost by a small amount, farms are limited by the extraction capacity of their
wells. They elect not to invest in type 3 wells because the small gain is not large enough to justify
the cost.
Because farmers avoid the second wave of well deepening, the social benefit increases roughly
35% relative to flat tariffs. As a first approximation, we thus find that just over half the gains from
optimal management are due to the eliminating the effect of the distortionary subsidies. But, the
common pool problem remains critical; even when farmers are charged the true cost of electricity,
implementing optimal management will increase the aggregate benefit of irrigation by nearly 23%.
Moreover, this percentage may understate the true importance of addressing the common pool
externality. As we see in Figure 1, the path of water levels for the first several years is quite similar
among the three scenarios. Waiting to implement regulation until type 1 wells begin to fail lowers
the overall social benefits, but the percentage gain from that point forward increases to 54% using
the real energy cost and to over 400% using the flat tariffs.

5.2

Comparative statics

We conduct a series of comparative static simulations to test the sensitivity of our results to the
value of the parameters that we used. Table II presents the resulting percentage gains from imposing optimal management under various parameter values, while Figure 4 illustrates the impacts
on various outcome variables. In the figure, the first group of three bars illustrates the outcome in
our baseline scenario for each of the three management scenarios. The remaining groups illustrate
the outcomes for each of our comparative static scenarios. The dashed horizontal lines are drawn
at the height of the three baseline bars to facilitate comparisons across the different scenarios.17
The Online Appendix contains detailed descriptions of these simulations; we summarize the major
17 The horizontal lines are absent on the graph depicting the share irrigating since everyone is irrigating in the steady-

state in the baseline scenario. Moreover, since investment never occurs under optimal management, there are only two
horizontal lines and two bars on the present value of investment and maintenance graph.
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findings here.
Result 3. The percentage gains from management first rise with increases in investment cost and
then fall due to exit from agriculture.
We conduct a series of simulations varying the support of the investment cost distribution, including a mean-preserving contraction and raising or lowering each bound independently. We find
a non-monotonic effect of increasing investment cost on the percentage gains from management.
Since it makes socially wasteful investment more expensive, including higher investment costs
increases the gains from optimal management, until we move into a region where farms begin
electing to exit agriculture. Further increases in investment cost beyond this threshold will tend to
reduce socially wasteful investment in deeper well technology and therefore reduce the gains from
imposing optimal management. However, while the percentage gains are lower in these cases, we
have more reason to be concerned about equity in the outcome, since increasing numbers of farms
are driven out of irrigated agriculture.
Result 4. Low social discount rates lead to large gains from optimal management.
Our baseline simulations used a discount rate of 10%, which is relatively high compared to
most studies of the Gisser-Sanchez effect. Given the developing country context, we believe that
the 10% discount rate is appropriate, but this choice significantly influences the estimated results,
as Brill and Burness (1994) demonstrate and our results confirm.
Result 5. Lowering the choke price of water increases exit from irrigated agriculture. It increases
the percentage gain from optimal management relative to flat tariffs and decreases the percentage
gain relative to real marginal cost pricing.
Reducing the choke price of water impacts our estimates in three ways. First, it lowers the
benefit of water at every point, reducing the net present value of irrigation in all of the simulations.
Second, this lower benefit leads farmers to reduce consumption faster and reduces steady state
pumping lifts. Third, it reduces the number of farms irrigating in the common pool scenarios.
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Under real energy prices, only 53% of farms ever invest in type 2 wells, and just over 14% of
farms invest in type 2 wells but eventually abandon them to avoid continued maintenance costs on
wells that produce less water. The reduced investment substantially lowers the present value of
investment expenditures and, therefore, reduces the percentage gain from optimal management to
roughly 18%. Under flat tariffs, all farms still invest in type 2 wells and then type 3 wells. However,
almost 21% of the farms abandon the type 3 wells as yields fall (but before they run dry) because
the volume of water that can be pumped is insufficient to justify the costs of well maintenance
and the flat tariff. Since the investment is still incurred, we do not observe the mitigating effect of
reduced investment, and percentage gains increase to over 255%.
Result 6. Increasing aquifer storativity lowers the benefit of optimal management.
As expected from the Gisser-Sanchez literature, high aquifer storativity tends to make the gains
from management smaller (see e.g. Koundouri (2004)). Reducing the rate of aquifer decline by
one-third reduces our estimated gains to 24% with flat tariffs and just under 10% with real energy
costs. Note, however, that if we compute percentage gains just before the first wave of investment
would begin, the percentage gains would increase to almost 97% with flat tariffs and 24% with real
energy costs.

5.3

Model variations

We also test the sensitivity of our results to two model variations. First, we consider a more flexible
set of well technologies. Second, we model farmers as having adaptive expectations over future
groundwater depths, instead of rational expectations as in our baseline scenario.

5.3.1

Variations in the set of available well technologies

Our baseline simulations include three well technologies because the optimal management problem
proved numerically intractable with more than three dimensions. However, it is important to verify
that the constraint of three well types is not driving our results. In addressing this point, we explore
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the optimal management regime and the common pool regime separately.
For the optimal management regime, recall that the social planner only uses the first of the
three available technologies. Introducing additional technologies could never lower the net present
value that we compute with this set of three technologies, because the social planner would always
have the option not to choose the additional technologies. Therefore our estimate is a lower bound
on the net present value under optimal management. On the other hand, it is possible we could
be underestimating the net present value under optimal management. To explore this, we maintain three technologies but reduce the depths of the latter two options. In all cases, the optimal
management solution remains no investment, and there is no change in the net present value of
implementing the optimal management solution.
For the common pool problem, we note that the curse of dimensionality is substantially milder
than it is for our optimal management problem. Our common pool model can be solved in a
reasonable time frame as long as we keep the number of available technologies under 10. Our
original specification limited farmers choices in two key ways. First, we forced farmers to make
relatively large increases in well depth. Second, we artificially limited the maximum depths wells
could reach. By introducing new well options, we can identify the impacts of both restrictions.
For the flat tariff common pool scenario, we first consider 10m increments instead of our baseline 25m increments and maintain a maximum depth of 75m. This change slightly increases the
gains from imposing optimal management to 67.5%. We then maintain the 10m increments but
add more choices until the maximum depth is 115m. When offered the option, most farmers elect
to continue deepening their wells and gains from management increase to roughly 142%. By the
last year of simulation, just over 35% of farms have exited agriculture, but the remaining 65% are
still artificially constrained from deepening their wells further. If we could feasibly increase the
number of technologies to allow further deepening, the investment cycle would continue, further
lowering the net social benefit in the common pool simulation. We thus find that artificially limiting the number of technologies available in the common pool scenario to three widely spaced
wells underestimated the degree of the common pool problem with flat tariffs.
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For the real marginal cost common pool scenario, we used 5m increments and a maximum
depth of 55m. In this scenario, we find two changes. First, as with the flat tariff results, farmers
take longer to reach a given depth. Second, while all of the farmers eventually deepened their
wells to 50m in the baseline scenario, we find that 27% of the farmers will choose to deepen wells
until they reach 45m but will elect to exit agriculture rather than deepen their wells to 50m, while
the remaining 73% will stop at 50m rather than continue to 55m. None of the farmers elect to
deepen wells further than 50m. Combining both effects lowers the percentage gains from optimal
management to roughly 17%. Because no farmers elect to deepen wells further than 50m, our
original technology options do not artificially constrain the maximum depth but do overstate the
pace and thus the cost of investment. Still, our more detailed results confirm the existence of
substantial gains from imposing optimal management compared to a common pool problem in
which farmers have the option to invest to overcome capacity limits.
While our simulations are necessarily approximations, we believe they track real world investment patterns like those described in Perveen et al. (2012) better than continual small adjustments.
While our results do not match the observed investment patterns exactly, they show a broadly
similar outcome: farmers invest regularly, but not every year.
Finally, we consider multiple technologies and vary the shares of the investment costs that
are fixed and the portion that depend on the depth of the final well, irrespective of starting point.
The variation has little impact on our results. Under flat tariffs, lower fixed costs are associated
with marginally smaller , but still quite large, gains from optimal management. In contrast, under
real marginal cost pricing, lower fixed costs are associated with slightly higher gains from imposing optimal management because more farms ultimately invest in 50m deep wells and associated
pumps.

5.3.2

Adaptive expectations about water levels

Our baseline simulations assume farmers have rational expectations about future groundwater levels. We conduct additional simulations where farmers believe water levels will remain constant at
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their current level indefinitely and only invest in a deeper well technology if it makes sense to do
under that assumption. We find adaptive expectations make the common pool scenario somewhat
less damaging. Instead of proactively deepening their wells in anticipation of water levels falling
as their neighbors also deepen wells, farmers wait to invest until levels actually fall. Slower investment increases the social benefits of the common pool scenarios. As a result, the gain from
imposing optimal management falls to 55% relative to flat tariffs and 19% relative to real marginal
cost pricing. Although the estimates are smaller, they suggest that our finding of large gains is
robust to scenarios under which farmers have either rational or adaptive expectations about future
groundwater levels.

6

Discussion

Our results are consistent with widespread concern about groundwater over-extraction in India.
Understanding the issue of groundwater sustainability in India is especially critical in the context
of climate change, which may lead to more erratic rainfall and increased demands on groundwater
usage as farmers adapt to new rainfall patterns (Zaveri et al., 2016; Fishman, 2016; Taraz, 2017;
Fishman, 2018). Policies that have been suggested to address groundwater over-extraction include
changing the electricity price; rationing water use with fixed quantitative ceilings on water and
electricity per hectare (Suhag, 2016); instituting local regulations on drilling depth and the distance
between wells; and encouraging farmers to switch crops or adopt precision irrigation technologies.
We leave detailed analysis of these remaining policies to future work, but note that our work
casts helpful light on some of the options. Our results highlight the importance of electricity
pricing and suggest that moving to full cost electricity pricing would reduce the common pool
externality significantly, but would not eliminate the problems, especially in regions that have yet
to experience substantial well deepening. We do not explicitly simulate the impact of making this
shift after several waves of well deepening have occurred, but our results indicate that doing so
would dramatically reduce pumping. We find that well depths are driven below the maximum
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economic depth for pumping. Each successive year at the steady-state in our common pool, flat
tariff scenario produces societal losses. If farmers paid the full cost of electricity, they would
cease to pump groundwater. This reality has been noted by previous authors and underlies strong
political pressure from farmer groups to maintain the subsidized flat tariffs.18
An alternate approach would be to place fixed limits on the amount of water and/or electricity
that can be used on a hectare of land. In our model, time-varying limits on either water or electricity
could be used to implement the optimal management solution we identify, since we only consider
farmer heterogeneity with respect to investment cost. In a more detailed model with cross-farmer
heterogeneity in the water benefit function, uniform limits would likely be able to capture much,
but not all, of the potential gains from optimal management. There are also calls to place limits
on drilling or deepening wells. Since our results suggest that much of the common pool problem
is related to investment, limits on drilling or deepening wells could prevent future waves of well
deepening. This is especially important given our results in Section 5.3.1, which suggest that well
deepening would likely continue on beyond 75m if the option is available.19
Since decisions about crop choice are embedded in our water benefit function, we cannot directly assess the impact of encouraging farmers to change crops. However, our results do suggest
that lowering the marginal benefit of the first units of water—by discouraging rice cultivation
and/or increasing the return to less water intensive crops—could substantially reduce the common
pool losses, if coupled with marginal cost electricity pricing.
The Indian government has also adopted policies to promote more efficient irrigation technologies (Sekhri, 2013b; Fishman et al., 2016). Including the option to invest in efficient irrigation
technology is beyond the scope of our model. We also note that efficient irrigation has a much
smaller impact on consumptive use of water than it does on applied water. Moreover, evidence
suggests that improved irrigation technology may expand irrigated acreage and ultimately increase
18 In the Online Appendix, we explore the use of electricity prices greater than marginal cost to reduce the common
pool externality.
19 Observers also often suggest restrictions on the distance between wells. The spatially explicit model in Brozović
et al. (2010) suggests such restrictions may be helpful. Our model and data do not provide enough detail about the
spatial distribution of wells in the region to assess how successful such a policy would be.
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water consumption (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012, 2014a; Fishman et al., 2015).

7

Conclusions

There are widespread concerns about the rapid depletion of groundwater in India, which has potentially catastrophic negative impacts on food security and poverty (Sekhri, 2014). We update
the canonical groundwater common pool resource model to incorporate key features relevant for
India: low marginal extraction costs due to highly subsidized flat rate electricity tariffs; well capacity constraints based on groundwater depth; and endogenous well investment to overcome these
constraints. Numerical simulations of our model suggest substantial societal losses due to groundwater over-extraction and excessive investment in well-deepening: optimal management would
increase the net social benefit of irrigation in our study region by 66% relative to common pool
groundwater use with flat electricity tariffs and 23% relative to relative to a common pool scenario
where farmers pay the full marginal costs of electricity. These estimates are much higher than
many existing studies of groundwater management gains.
Previous work has documented the impact of electricity subsidies on increased pumping, but
we make a critical contribution to this literature by explicitly linking three market failures—an
electricity cost subsidy, a pumping cost externality, and an entry/investment cost externality—in
a framework that provides numerical estimates of the potential gains from management. These
market failures are reinforcing in that the problems associated with each externality compound the
others. For instance, while Badiani and Jessoe (2017) find relatively small deadweight losses from
the electricity subsidies in a static framework, we find that these subsidies substantially increase
the common pool externality by increasing investment in deeper wells that are socially wasteful.
Although there is variation in the magnitudes, our finding of substantial societal losses is robust to
a variety of changes in the fundamental parameters of our model. In addition to efficiency losses,
under some parameter scenarios we also reveal equity issues. Specifically, as investment costs rise
or benefits fall, some farms are driven out of irrigated agriculture—either shifting towards dryland
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agriculture, exiting from agriculture, or migrating out of the region—consistent with results found
by other researchers (Fishman et al., 2017).
Our analysis focused on a particular region in India that has already experienced severe declines
in groundwater levels with accompanying substantial investments in well-deepening, but our work
is also relevant to other regions that are at earlier points in their groundwater development. Roy
and Shah (2002) describe a common path of groundwater use in numerous regions as moving
“from a stage where [an] underutilized groundwater resource becomes instrumental in unleashing
[an] agrarian boom to one in which, unable to apply brakes in time, the region goes overboard
in exploiting its groundwater resources.” Our work illustrates the critical role that investment
in deeper wells can play in driving this cycle, especially when government policies exacerbate,
rather than dampen the natural challenge. In many regions, governments have initially subsidized
investments in groundwater irrigation hoping to trigger expansion of irrigation and reductions in
poverty. If these subsidies are not removed once irrigation takes off, they can quickly become
pathological and lead individual users to compete away all or most of the gains from irrigation in
a competitive drilling and deepening race. Our results thus indicate the importance of caution as
new regions like eastern India seek to expand groundwater irrigation.
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Figure 2: Water use over time by scenario
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Figure 3: Accumulated costs and net benefits
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of model outcomes to model parameters
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Tables
Table I: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter

Description

Value

r
d0
β
γ
w̄
(d¯1 , d¯2 , d¯3 )
(d˜1 , d˜2 , d˜3 )
ε
(τ1 , τ2 , τ3 )
α

1
Discount rate (δ = 1+r
)
Initial pumping lift
Intercept of marginal benefit of water
Slope of marginal benefit of water
Maximum water use per hectare
Vector of maximum depths for each well type
Vector of maximum depths at which each well type can extract w̄
Cost of energy needed to lift 1m3 of water up 1m∗
Vector of electricity tariffs for each well type∗∗
Share of applied water that percolates back to aquifer
Ratio of maximum consumptive use to natural inflow

10%
2m
2.00 Rs./m3
2.18*10e-5 Rs./m3 /m3
40,000 m3 /ha
(25, 50, 75) meters
(10, 30, 60) meters
3.6*10e-2 Rs./m3 /m
(2.18, 6.54, 13.08) thousand Rs./ha
25%
3

Annual drop with maximum water usage
Initial pumping depth
Vector of baseline maintenance costs for each well type
Baseline cost of moving from technology 1 to 2
Baseline cost of moving from technology 2 to 3
Baseline cost of moving from technology 1 to 3
Ratio of maximum technology cost to minimum technology cost

3m
2m
(0,1600,4000) Rs./ha
39,333 Rs./ha
40,000 Rs./ha
76,000 Rs./ha
2

(1−α)w̄
ρ
(1−α)w̄−ρ
φ

d0
(χ11 , χ22 , χ33 )
χ12
χ23
χ13
Ω
∗ε

computed by dividing the energy needed to lift 1 cubic meter of water up 1 meter (0.0027 kWh/m3 /m) by the average
pump efficiency in the region (25%) and multiplying by the true cost of energy (3.3 Rs./kWh)
∗∗ τ computed by computing the energy needed to lift w̄ units from d˜ and multiplying the average farm cost of electricity
i
i
(0.5 Rs./kWh)

Table II: Sensitivity of Percentage Gains to Model Parameters
% gain from optimal management
Flat Tariffs
Real Energy Cost

Description

Values changed from base parameters

Baseline

None

66.0

22.6

Smaller investment cost range
Lower minimum investment cost
Higher minimum investment cost
Lower maximum investment cost
Higher maximum investment cost

(χ23 = 55, 000 Rs./ha, Ω = 1.18
χ23 = 30, 000 Rs./ha
χ23 = 50, 000 Rs./ha
Ω = 1.5
Ω = 2.5

71.1
58.6
76.2
63.7
73.6

24.8
20.1
26.2
20.4
20.2

Much lower maximum investment cost
Lower discount rate

Ω = 1.125
r = 5%

58.8
465.9

19.7
60.0

Lower marginal benefit intercept
Steeper marginal benefit slope

β = 1.3 Rs./m3
γ = −2.88 ∗ 10e−5 Rs./m3 /m3

255.6
106.0

17.9
25.8

Lower annual drop

(1−α)w̄−ρ
= 2m
φ
(1−α)w̄
=2
ρ

24.3

9.6

87.8

35.3

Higher recharge

38

Authors' Accepted Manuscript
Forthcoming at the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Online appendices: Not intended for print publication
A

A numerically feasible optimal management problem

The optimal management problem described in the text has N + 1 state variables (the technology
on each farm and the pumping depth) and 2N control variables (next period technology choice
and water use on each farm). Numerical solution of the problem in this format is not feasible,
so we conduct our numerical simulations using a simplified optimal management problem. First,
since all farms with the same technology have the same instantaneous benefit of water use and the
same impact on future water depth, we can consider only I water use variables, given by the vector
w = (w1 , ..., wI ) . For notational compactness, we also define a vector version of the instantaneous
net benefit function B (w, d) = (B (w1 , d, 1) , ..., B (wI , d, I)) giving the instantaneous net benefit of
water use on farms using each of the technologies as a function of the technology specific water
use vector.
To further reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we move from considering technology on
each individual farms to considering shares of farms using each technology. We define a vector
z = (z1 , ..., zI ) that gives the share of farms currently using each technology. Since the shares
must sum to 1, this leaves us with I state variables: the pumping depth d and the I − 1 shares that
uniquely determine the full share vector z. We can similarly reduce the number of control variables
by considering the share of farms planning to use different technologies for the next period.The
matrix of choice shares for the next period’s technology is X; its typical element xi j is the share of
farms currently using technology j that will use technology i next period. The total cost of next
period’s technology choices is K (X, z).
There is one additional complication to this approach. Since the cost of technology choices
varies by farm, we need to retain information about which farms use each technology to correctly
compute the cost. In particular, the Nzi farms currently using technology i have systematically
different costs for selecting each of the different technologies for the following period than the
Nz j farms currently using technology j due to both their current technology and the difference
in investment costs that led to their different technology states. We assume that, at any point in
time, the farms using the most expensive technology are the ones with the lowest investment cost,
allowing us to infer the distribution of technology costs among farms currently using technology
j from the vector of current technology shares z. As with the state variable shares, each of the Ielement column vectors making up X must sum to 1 implying that the I 2 element matrix is uniquely
determined by I (I − 1) elements. This results in an optimal management problem given by
∞


max ∑ δ t Nzt0 B (wt , dt ) − K (Xt , zt )
w,X t=0
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subject to
dt+1 = dt +

(1 − α) Nz0 w − ρ
for t = 0, ..., ∞
φ
zt+1 = Xt zt for t = 0, ..., ∞
I

∑ xi jt = 1 for t = 0, ..., ∞ and j = 1, .., I

i=1

0 ≤ wit ≤ W (dt , i) for t = 0, ..., ∞ and i = 1, .., I
with d0 and z0 given. Again, we reformulate this as a dynamic programming problem:
V

OPT

0

(d, z) = max Nz B (w, d) − K (X, z) + δV

OPT

w,X



(1 − α) Nz0 w − ρ
d+
, Xz
(17)
φ

subject to
wi ≤ W (d, i)
and

I

∑ xi jt = 1.

i=1

As described in the model section, our parameterization uses the farm specific cost function
C ( j, i, ω) = χi j ω.
with ω distributed uniformly between 1 and an upper bound Ω. Since the cheaper technologies
have lower values of i and we assume that these technologies are employed by the farms with the
highest investment costs, we can compute the range of ω values associated with each technology
from the shares using each technology. The investment cost function under optimal management
is given by
ωiUB
j (X,z)

ˆ

K (X, z) = ∑ ∑ χ ji
i

j

ω f (ω) dω

ωiLB
j (X,z)

LB
where ωiUB
j (X, z) and ωi j (X, z) give the upper and lower bounds of the cost parameter value
for the farms switching from technology j to technology i given starting shares z and investment
choice matrix X. To derive these bounds we note that all farms with ω i (z) < ωn ≤ ω̄i (z) are

currently using technology i. The cutoff values are given by ω̄i (z) = F ∑ j<i z j and ω i (z) =

F ∑ j≤i z j . Using similar logic, we can identify the farms that make each technology choice
since upgrading to a technology with a higher index is more expensive. Specifically ωiUB
j (X, z) =

40

Authors' Accepted Manuscript
Forthcoming at the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management



F ω̄ j (z) − z j ∑k<i xk j and ωiLB
j (X, z) = F ω̄ j (z) − z j ∑k≤i xk j .

B

Parameterization appendix

In this appendix, we give additional details on how we selected our parameter values.

B.1

Benefit of water

Each season a farmer chooses to grow some fraction of his land with rice. Rice requires 1000
mm of irrigation water during the kharif season and 1500 mm of irrigation water in each of the
rabi and summer seasons (Fishman et al., 2015). Therefore, the maximum volume of water that
a farmer will choose to use is 4000 mm of water annually. A farm using 4000 mm of water each
year extracts 40,000 m3 of water per hectare (ha) of land. Evidence suggests that farmers adjust
their water usage by reducing acreage planted in rice rather than the reducing the amount of water
used per hectare (Fishman et al., 2017).
We estimate that the average, per season net income (exclusive of groundwater costs) from
growing rice is 17,000 Rupees (Rs.) per hectare, while the dryland crops earn 4,000 Rs./ha
(ICRISAT, 2015). ICRISAT (2015) gives net revenue numbers which we convert to net income
by that assuming net income (exclusive of groundwater costs) is equal to 50% of the net revenue.
This suggests that marginal benefit of irrigation varies from 13,000 Rs./ha during kharif to 17,000
Rs./ha during rabi and summer. Due to the differing irrigation water needs, this corresponds to
1.3 Rs./m3 of water during kharif and 1.13 Rs./m3 during summer and rabi, suggesting a very flat
marginal benefit of water curve.

B.2

Well technologies and costs

Based on the costs of digging a tubewell and purchasing an electric pump given in Ministry of
Water Resources (2007) and Sekhri (2011), we assume that moving from technology 1 to 2 costs
between 39,333 Rs./ha to 78,666 Rs./ha for different farmers and moving from technology 2 to
3 costs between 40,000 Rs./ha to 80,000 Rs./ha for different farmers. The cross-farmer variation
in investment costs reflects variation in characteristics like wealth, information, credit, and land
characteristics. We calibrate the cost of moving from technology 1 to 2, versus the cost of moving
from technology 2 to 3, based on an investment cost structure that includes several components.
First, there is a variable cost that depends purely on how many meters the well is deepened. Second,
there is a fixed cost associated with any deepening of a well, which includes the costs of getting a
rig to the site, transporting materials, flushing the well, and the cost of a borewell cap (India Water
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Portal, 2009). Lastly, any substantial deepening of a well will require the purchase of a new pump
and deeper wells require more powerful pumps, suggesting that there is a component of the cost of
deepening a well that is purely a function of the final depth, and is independent of the amount of
deepening that occurs.
While it is difficult to precisely estimate the component of the cost of deepening associated
with each piece, we scale investment costs to other decisions by assuming the variable charge
accounts for 90% of the cost of moving from technology 2 to 3 and the remaining components
each represent 5% of the cost. Using these estimates, we conclude that the cost of moving from
technology 1 to 2 (an equivalent increase in depth) is 98% of the cost of moving from technology
2 to technology 3, which corresponds to the numbers listed above. Moreover, moving directly
from technology 1 to 3 would save 4.2% of the total cost. We set technology 1 to have no annual
maintenance costs, and technology 2 to have annual maintenance costs that are equal to 4% of
the investment costs (for that farmer) and technology 3 to have annual maintenance costs that are
equal to 10% of the investment costs (for that farmer), based on data on annual maintenance costs
provided in Ministry of Water Resources (2007).
Per unit pumping energy needs are based on the energy required to lift a cubic meter of groundwater one meter and the typical efficiency of groundwater pumps in India. Shah et al. (2006)
estimate that the typical groundwater pump in India has a pumping efficiency of roughly 25%.
Farmers in this region pay a flat tariff that is a function of the horsepower of their pump. These
tariffs are set so that they are linear relative to the monthly pumping capacity of each pump. Based
on Badiani and Jessoe (2017), we assume that farmers pay 0.5 Rs. for each kWh of capacity.
Thus, a 2 HP pump, with a capacity of roughly 400 kWh per month pays 200 Rs. per month or
2400 Rs./year. Badiani et al. (2012) note that the 0.5 Rs./kWh is roughly 15% of the actual cost of
electricity, implying an actual electricity cost of 3.3 Rs./kWh.

B.3

Aquifer parameters

We use a value of 25% for the return flow coefficient, based on a reported range of 20% to 35%
in Ministry of Water Resources (2009). The annual inflow (or recharge) is the amount of water,
exclusive of return flow, that flows into the aquifer each year. We set this number relative to the
maximum consumptive use in the region. Since 25% of the 40,000 m3 applied to a fully irrigated
ha returns to the aquifer, maximum consumptive use is 30,000 m3 /ha. We note that the average
level of groundwater development—measured as the ratio of current usage to annual recharge—is
about 150% in our study area (Suhag, 2016). In addition, currently roughly 50% of the sown
area is irrigated with groundwater (Fishman et al., 2016). This indicates that if all sown land was
irrigated then water usage would be 300% of annual recharge. Hence, we parameterize annual
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recharge to be 10,000 m3 /ha, or roughly 1/3 of the maximum consumptive use. To parameterize
aquifer storativity, we use an inductive approach. Groundwater levels have been dropping as much
as 3 meters per year with current extraction (Fishman et al., 2017). We infer a storativity value by
assuming that if all farmers in the region fully irrigated their land every year, water levels would
drop 3m each year.

C
C.1

Comparative statics appendix
Changes in investment costs

One of the striking conclusions of our baseline scenario is that, despite the variation in investment
costs, all farms make essentially the same decisions about investment. There is variation in the
timing of each move, because the lower cost farms will invest at a lower threshold than the high cost
farms. But, with the investment cost distribution above, all farms eventually invest in technology 2
in both common pool scenarios. Similarly, all farms invest in technology 3 if facing flat tariffs but
none invest if facing real energy prices. We conducted a series of additional simulations in which
we varied the cost of investment. In our baseline scenario, we assume that moving from technology
2 to 3 costs farmers between 40,000 Rs./ha to 80,000 Rs./ha, with the variation depending on farmer
characteristics like wealth, information, credit, and land characteristics. We conducted simulations
for five variations: (a) a mean-preserving contraction of the distribution ranging from 55,000 Rs./ha
to 65,000 Rs./ha, (b) lowering the minimum investment cost from 40,000 Rs./ha to 30,000 Rs./ha,
(c) raising the minimum investment cost to 50,000 Rs./ha, (d) lowering the maximum investment
cost from 80,000 Rs./ha to 60,000 Rs./ha, (e) raising the maximum investment cost to 100,000
Rs./ha, and (f) lowering the maximum investment cost to 45,000 Rs./ha. In our baseline simulation,
we assume that moving from technology 1 to 2 costs 98% of this amount that it costs to move from
technology 2 to 3. For this set of comparative statics, we assume that the cost of moving from
technology 1 to 2 is always 98% of whatever it costs to move from technology 2 to 3.
Most of these simulations have only small impacts on the outcome. The timing of choices
varies slightly, but the essential character of the solution remains unchanged. In these cases, changing investment costs has no impact on the net present value of irrigation under optimal management
(since investment never occurs). Moreover, since investment follows essentially the same pattern
as in the base case, revenues and pumping expenditures remain almost unchanged in the common
pool cases. Changing investment costs does have a small impact on the present value of investment expenditures, with higher investment costs leading to larger costs. These larger costs lower
the net present value of irrigation. The percentage gains from optimal management increase because the numerator (the level of gains) increases and because the denominator (the common pool
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net benefits) falls.
Raising the maximum investment cost to 100,000 Rs./ha, has a similar impact as the other
cases under flat tariffs. In contrast, in the common pool scenario with real energy costs, we now
see some farms shift to dryland crops or exit agriculture, instead of investing in deeper wells. For
this particular value, 10% of the farms elect to exit agriculture. Since the remaining farms pump
more in the steady-state as a result, this change has a minimal effect on revenues, lowering the
present value by just over 2%. At the same time, this exit reduces steady state pumping lifts by
about 1m and decreases the present value of all pumping expenditures by about 4.25%. More
importantly, it reduces the present value of investment expenditures by about 14% relative to the
baseline. The combined effect is to increase the net present value of irrigation benefits by just
under 2% and to reduce the percentage gain from optimal management from 23% to 20%.

C.2

Lower discount rate

We conducted another set of simulations using a discount rate of 5%. The lower discount rate
substantially increases the estimated gains to management for two reasons. First, under optimal
management, the higher weight placed on future benefits leads to lower pumping today and higher
steady-state water levels (and therefore lower steady-state pumping costs), while steady-state water
levels remain virtually unchanged in the common pool scenarios. Second, the large difference
between gains in the future and the investment expenses weighs more heavily in the comparison
between scenarios, since they are not discounted as heavily. As a result, we find that optimal
management would increase net benefits by over 465% if farmers are facing flat tariffs, and by
60% if they are facing real marginal energy prices.
Although it is not apparent in our main comparison, there is a third way that lowering the
discount rate can increase the estimated gains. We conducted another comparative static simulation
in which we lowered the discount rate for our high maximum investment cost scenario. In this
simulation, the lower discount rate increases farms’ incentive to invest in the real marginal energy
cost scenario. Instead of 90% of the farms choosing to invest in technology 2, 96% of farms
do. The lower discount rate thus reduces the rate at which increasing investment costs will slow
investment and reduce the gains from management.

C.3

Changes in the marginal benefit of water

Because we have chosen to use a reduced form water benefit function that subsumes many other
annual choices, we conduct comparative statics on the specific parameters and describe qualitatively what these results suggest about the embedded choices. Our baseline simulations used a
marginal benefit of water that starts at 2 Rs./ha, falls linearly to 1.13 Rs./ha at 40,000 m3 /ha, and
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then drops discontinuously to 0 at any higher level. We conducted additional simulations in which
we lowered each of these values. Reducing the initial marginal benefit (choke price) corresponds
to rotating the marginal benefit curve downward around the value at the maximum water use level.
This simulation is described in the text.
One real world change that could lead to this shift would be the introduction of higher value
dryland crops and/or increases in the price of such crops. In contrast, a high choke price suggests
a substantial marginal value of the first units of irrigation. Results from our simulations with a
high choke price can thus shed light on the consequences of reduced irrigation on crop prices. If
irrigation falls across the region, the price of rice might rise due to general equilibrium effects,
indicating a much higher value of the first units of water than would be estimated holding rice
prices constant.20 Our results suggest that this would lead to higher estimates of the gains from
imposing management relative to true marginal electricity pricing and a lower estimate of the gains
from imposing management relative to flat tariffs.
We also conduct a simulation lowering the marginal benefit at the maximum level, which corresponds to increasing the slope of the marginal benefit curve while keeping its vertical intercept
unchanged. This similarly reduces the benefit of water at every point, reducing the net present
value of irrigation in every simulation. However, since it is well capacity limits and the maximum
water needed for fully irrigating a field that tend to determine farmers’ water use, this change has
minimal impact on farmers’ water use. Steady-state levels, and thus the present value of pumping
expenditures, remain virtually unchanged. Under flat tariffs, the change has no effect on investment and increases the percentage gains from management to106%. In contrast, under real energy
prices, the reduced benefit of water reduces the incentives for farms to invest, and 9% of farms exit
irrigation rather than invest in type 2 wells. While reduced investment tends to lower the gain to
management, the net effect of the changes is still positive, with percentage gains increasing from
nearly 23% to nearly 26%.

C.4

Changes in aquifer parameters

Our baseline simulations set natural recharge at one-third of the maximum annual consumptive use
in the region and storativity by assuming that if all farmers fully irrigated their land each year (thus
using three times the natural inflow), water levels would drop 3m each year.
We first conducted a simulation where the annual drop rate was reduced to 2m per year, corresponding to an increase in the storativity of the aquifer. This has no significant impact on the
20 Note

that while it would be possible to define a water benefit function incorporating general equilibrium effects
suitable for use in the optimal management problem, this would not be viable for the common pool problem. Farmers
would properly take the price of the crops as given when making decisions but then form expectations about the price
based on their assumptions about neighbors responses.
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eventual steady-state levels but increases the time it takes to get there and the amount of water
extracted along the way. The extra extraction increases the present value of benefits in every case
and decreases the present value of pumping expenditures (because the high pumping costs occur
later and more water is extracted from shallower depths). Moreover, it pushes investment forward
lowering the present value of those expenditures. The net effect is to reduce percentage gains substantially to 24% with flat tariffs and just under 10% with real energy costs. Note, however, that if
we compute percentage gains just before the first wave of investment would begin, the percentage
gains would increase to almost 97% with flat tariffs and 24% with real energy costs.
We also conducted a simulation where steady-state recharge was increased to half of the maximum annual consumptive use, while the annual drop in response to full irrigation was held constant. Since the annual drop is a function of the difference between extraction and recharge, increasing recharge and holding the annual change constant implies decreasing the storativity of the
aquifer since a smaller amount of over-extraction is lowering water levels by the same amount.
This combined change increases the steady-state water consumption and raises the steady-state
water level. Since steady-state water consumption goes up, gross benefits increase in all cases,
although the increase is largest under optimal management. The reduced pumping depths mean
that per unit pumping expenditures are smaller but since more water is being pumped, total expenditures on pumping increase in the two common pool scenarios. The net effect is to increase
percentage gains from optimal management to almost 88% relative to flat tariffs and 35% relative
to real energy costs.

C.5

Changes in the price of electricity

In principle, charging farmers more than the true cost of electricity could help mitigate the remaining common pool problem. We conduct an additional series of simulations to explore this
possibility, first increasing the size of the flat tariffs and then implementing a volumetric charge
at rates above the true marginal cost. If the rates are high enough, either approach could effectively deter investment in deeper wells and thus eliminate most of the common pool externality.
However, doing so would require large increases in electricity costs for farmers. We find that it
would require a tariff on type 2 pumps of nearly 5.3 times the current tariff coupled with a tariff
on type 3 pumps nearly 2.2 times as high as the current tariff to prevent investment and achieve
close to the social optimum levels of water usage and irrigation investment. Similarly, we find that
the government would need to set volumetric tariffs at roughly 1.7 times the true marginal cost
to eliminate investment. Given the lack of political will to move to true cost pricing, it is highly
unlikely that these large increases would be politically viable in India at this time.
The increased electricity prices in both scenarios serve to help internalize the user cost of
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water. Note however that neither constant price can appropriately reflect the time varying user
cost of water. Hence, while either regime can replicate the socially optimal investment trajectory
(no investment), neither can exactly replicate the socially optimal pumping path. Moreover, note
that pursuing this policy would only be beneficial if the government uses the surplus revenue from
electricity in socially beneficial ways. Farmers in the region would be worse off under either policy
unless the surplus revenue was returned to them in a lump-sum fashion.

D
D.1

Model variations appendix
Detailed descriptions of simulations varying well technologies

As described in the text, we address optimal management and common pool scenarios separately.
D.1.1

Variations under optimal management

We solve the optimal management problem with three different sets of maximum well depths:
{25, 30, 35}, {25, 35, 45}, and {25, 45, 65}. In all cases, the optimal management solution remains
no investment and there is no change in the net present value of implementing the optimal management solution. As we make the well increments shorter, the model solution becomes less stable
and more sensitive to starting points. In particular, our algorithm sometimes identifies a solution
in which deepening some of the wells at least once appears optimal, depending on the algorithm’s
starting point. Closer investigation reveals that these are local optima as the no investment solution identified in our baseline yields a slightly higher net present value. These results suggest that
limiting the options available to the social planner did not materially change the character of the
optimal management solution.
D.1.2

Variations under common pool regimes

For the flat tariff common pool scenario, we first offer farmers a set of technologies corresponding
to maximum well depths ranging from 25m to 75m in 10m increments instead of our baseline
25m increments to address the concern that the large depth increments artificially influenced our
results. This change slightly increases the gains from imposing optimal management. The net
social benefits of the common pool solution fall from just under 204,000 Rs./ha to just under
202,000 Rs/.ha, increasing the gains from imposing optimal management to 67.5%.
While the 10m increments are substantially more granular than the baseline simulations, they
still restrict farmers’ options. We are unable to numerically solve our model with finer well increments while maintaining a maximum depth of 75m, but we also consider a scenario with 5m
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depth increments with a maximum depth of 65m. In this simulation, we find that both artificially
constraining the investment cycle to end at 65m and using a finer grid of options increases the
social benefit under the common pool scenario. Net social benefits rise to roughly 228,000 Rs./ha
and the gains from imposing optimal management fall to 48%. Still, we note that the accumulated
benefits under our baseline scenario and this modified scenario track quite closely until we reach
the artificial limit at 65m. Moreover, we note that when 5m increments are offered, we begin to
observe leap-frogging behavior where some farms elect to deepen their wells by 10m rather than
5m to save on fixed costs.
We then offer farmers the option to continue deepening their wells by considering maximum
well depths ranging from 25m to 115m in 10m increments. When offered the option, most farmers elect to continue deepening their wells. Net social benefits fall to just under 140,000 Rs./ha
and gains from management increase to roughly 142%. By the last year of simulation, just over
35% of farms have exited agriculture, but the remaining 65% are still artificially constrained from
deepening their wells further. If we could feasibly increase the number of technologies to allow
further deepening, the investment cycle would continue, further lowering the net social benefit in
the common pool simulation. Additional simulations with larger well increments and deeper maximum depths confirm this fact. We thus find that artificially limiting the number of technologies
available in the common pool scenario to three widely spaced wells underestimated the degree of
the common pool problem with flat tariffs.
For the real marginal cost common pool scenario, we considered 7 well technologies with
the maximum depths ranging from 25m to 55m in 5m increments. In this scenario, we find two
changes. First, as with the flat tariff results, farmers take longer to reach a given depth. Second,
while all of the farmers eventually deepened their wells to 50m in the baseline scenario, we find
that 27% of the farmers will choose to deepen wells until they reach 45m but will elect to exit
agriculture rather than deepen their wells to 50m, while the remaining 73% will stop at 50m rather
than continue to 55m. None of the farmers elect to deepen wells further than 50m. Combining
both effects increases net present value of social benefits from 276,000 to 289,000 Rs/ha, lowering
the percentage gains from optimal management to roughly 17%.
Perveen et al. (2012) report that over a 10 year period, 10% of farmers didn’t deepen their
well, 35% of farmers deepened their well once, 35% of farmers deepened their well twice, and
20% deepened their well three times or more. In contrast, in our baseline scenario, we observe one
wave of deepening in years 5 and 6 (under both flat tariffs and real marginal cost pricing) and a
second wave of deepening 8-9 years later (in years 13 and 14) with flat tariffs. When we offer finer
increments, the pattern depends on the pricing structure. With real marginal cost pricing and 5m
increments available, we observe a wave of deepening in years 3-4, a second wave in years 8-10 in
which a small number of farms invest twice and most leap-frog technologies, a third wave whose
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timing occurs between 10 and 20 years later depending on the farm’s cost. Some farms elect to
exit agriculture instead of deepening their wells in this wave. With flat tariffs and 10m increments
available, we observe waves of deepening every 3-4 years. With flat tariffs and 5m increments,
we again observe waves roughly every 3-4 years. In each of these waves, most farms leap-frog
technologies and deepen their wells by 10m, while some invest twice. While our results do not
match the observed investment patterns exactly, they show a broadly similar outcome: farmers
invest regularly, but not every year.
Finally, we conduct an additional series of simulations where we consider multiple technologies and consider different shares of the investment costs that are fixed and the portion that depend
on the depth of the final well, irrespective of starting point. We consider values of 2.5%, 5%,
and 10% for each of the costs. The variation has little impact on our results. Under flat tariffs,
lower fixed costs are associated with marginally smaller, but still quite large, gains from optimal
management. When we assume the fixed portion of the cost is only 2.5% instead of 5%, the gain
from imposing optimal management when considering 10m well increments up to 115m falls from
125% to 121%. In contrast, under real marginal cost pricing, lower fixed costs are associated with
slightly higher gains from imposing optimal management because more farms ultimately invest in
50m deep wells and associated pumps. Percentage gains increase from 17.12% to 17.45%.
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